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Abstract 
Parallel import, as a pattern of international trade, is often under 
criticism because of infringement of intellectual property. However, the 
establishment of China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone has contributed to 
the rapid development of parallel import, which has existed in the “grey zone” 
in China for a long time. Generally speaking, parallel import not only 
minimizes damages to related intellectual property owners, but also 
maximizes flow of goods and promotes formation of a unified market, which 
is beneficial to free trade and economic integration as well as the welfare of 
consumers. This paper investigates two industries most affected by parallel 
import, namely the automobile industry and the pharmaceutical industry. Two 
cases, “Peugeot Unfair Competition” and “Compulsory Licensing of the 
Indian Pharmaceutical Industry”, are analyzed. This paper draws the 
conclusion that the general welfare of society must be considered and a clear 
boundary of intellectual property rights should be established in the 
development of trade policies on parallel import. Effective use of parallel 
import can ultimately promote social development. 
 
Keywords: Parallel Import, Intellectual Property, Parallel Import Cars, 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
1. Introduction 
With low political risk, rapid economic growth, a high degree of 
openness to international trade and abundant natural resources, China has a 
positive environment for FDI (Mele and Quarto, 2017). From 1990 to 1999, 
China increased the stock of FDI from less than $19 billion to over $300 
billion. Therefore, according to the stock of inward FDI, China was ranked 
first among all developing countries in the world (Graham and Wada, 2001). 
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Parallel import, a new form of FDI, has recently emerged in China. 
Meanwhile, the establishment of China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone 
provides favorable policies for parallel import. Therefore, it is imperative to 
investigate the opportunities for the development of parallel import in China. 
Parallel import, more often than not, is considered infringement of 
intellectual property. The establishment of China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade 
Zone greatly promotes parallel import. Parallel import has been in China for a 
long time. Its status remains in the “grey zone”. To what extent does parallel 
import damage intellectual property? What are the advantages of parallel 
import? How does parallel import influence the market and the welfare of 
consumers? This paper attempts to answer the abovementioned questions by 
investigating two industries most affected by parallel import, i.e., the 
automobile industry and the pharmaceutical industry. Two cases, “Peugeot 
Unfair Competition” and “Compulsory Licensing of the Indian 
Pharmaceutical Industry”, are analyzed. 
A great deal of literature pertains to whether parallel import has more 
advantages (benefit to importing countries) or disadvantages (damage to 
intellectual property holders). For China, a developing country with the largest 
market in the world, should parallel import be allowed? 
Price differences of the same product at home and abroad and the 
monopoly of individual enterprises are both obstacles to economic 
development. Abuse of the rights of intellectual property may aggravate non-
tariff barriers - the deterioration of trade barriers of intellectual property. If 
parallel import functions in an orderly way, it can help break the monopoly of 
patents and copyrights, and ultimately lead to enhancement of social welfare 
of a nation. The social goal of economic globalization is to save resources and 
improve economic efficiency. Parallel import can exploit comparative 
advantages of nations, so that resources can be allocated efficiently in the 
world market and improve economic efficiency (Gao, 2007). 
With reference to Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights, and principle of 
territoriality, this paper investigates parallel import in the automobile industry 
and the pharmaceutical industry. This paper explores the influence of the two 
agreements and the two principles of parallel import. In addition, this paper 
discusses the current situation and the future development trend of parallel 
import in the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone. This paper proposes 
policy implications according to theories and case analysis. 
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
reviews related literature. Section 3 introduces institutional background and 
theory. Section 4 analyzes the case of the automobile industry. Section 5 is 
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devoted to the case of the pharmaceutical industry. Section 6 proposes policy 
implications. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Related Literature 
Parallel import is the result of expansion and restriction of intellectual 
property rights and the choice of national trade policy. Nations choose 
appropriate principles of intellectual property according to their own interests. 
Yan (2012) points out that it is suitable for nations against parallel import to 
use Domestic Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights or Principle of 
Territoriality to prevent parallel import, while nations that support parallel 
import use International Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights or 
Principle of Universality. The application of these principles is related to 
intellectual property law. Nevertheless, the real determinant of the application 
of these principles is the strategy of national intellectual property protection 
and international trade. Zhang (2004) insists that Domestic Exhaustion of 
Intellectual Property Rights is not the only basis on which whether parallel 
import infringes intellectual property is judged. The government’s economic 
policy, trade policy, and relevant laws and regulations are more important 
factors. In other words, whether parallel import infringes intellectual property 
is related to a nation’s weighing of interests, and Domestic Exhaustion of 
Intellectual Property Rights can only serve the practice. Liu (2006) reasserts 
that Domestic Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights is the theoretical 
foundation of legalizing parallel import while Principle of Territoriality is the 
theoretical basis against parallel import. Parallel import can be regulated by 
two measures. One is to allow restricted access to parallel import through 
Principle of Territoriality. The other is to regulate parallel import through 
Anti-Unfair Competition Law. 
Li (2010) states that legislation of parallel import should first consider 
national conditions, and refer to previous legislative experience and 
international trend at the same time. Legislation should proceed step by step 
on the basis of respecting the interests of intellectual property owners and 
protecting a nation’s economy and its technical and cultural industries. Zou 
(2003) argues that China is a developing and export-oriented country on which 
parallel import cannot have a great impact for a long time. Therefore, China 
should adopt an eased attitude towards parallel import and promote its export 
and circulation of commodities. 
The automobile industry and the pharmaceutical industry are two 
industries which are most affected by parallel import. Qing (2014) insists that 
the launch of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone and the “three 
guarantees” of the automobile market are valuable. However, future 
development of parallel import cars depends on reform of national laws and 
systems. Standardized operation of parallel import cars is beneficial to pushing 
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the price system of imported cars to drop further so that the monopoly of 
import automobiles can be breached. Nevertheless, parallel import cars mainly 
rely on scattered orders from overseas distributors, who decide that the market 
scale should not expand much. Yan (2015) believes that the survival basis of 
the existing price system of import automobiles is the current Automobile 
Brand Sales Management Approach. Parallel import can only play a role in 
adjusting the price system of import automobiles. In order to break down the 
monopoly in the automobile industry, competition mechanism should be 
introduced. However, this means that the system of total dealer, which goes 
against the Approach, would be cancelled. In this situation, the proper 
introduction of parallel import becomes a breakthrough in breaking the price 
monopoly of import automobiles (Ke and Zhang, 2008). 
Dong (2006) describes provision of compulsory licensing for medicines 
in China in detail. When other nations need to import medicine to treat certain 
infectious diseases and fulfill relevant procedures, China can issue compulsory 
licensing to help these nations solve public health problems. Barfield and 
Groombridge (1999) argue that in the conflict between free trade and 
intellectual property protection, it is essential for the government to allow 
patent holders to control parallel import. This does not only promote 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, but also enhances the material 
interests of consumers in developed and developing countries. According to 
Bordoy and Jelovac (2003), if it is allowed to import a monopolized medicine 
from a nation to another, the total payment level of patients in different nations 
is different in terms of the effect that patients get from the consumption of the 
medicine. On one hand, parallel import reduces total social welfare in different 
national health systems; on the other hand, parallel import improves total 
social welfare in the health care system. Maskus and Ganslandt (2001) analyze 
data from Sweden and find that the average price of medicines in the Swedish 
market has fallen due to an increase in parallel import. The price of medicines 
affected by parallel import decreased by 12% to 19% compared with other 
medicines. Naghavi and Mantovani (2014) point out that the existence of 
parallel import medicines is due to price differences of medicines in different 
nations, which lead to potential arbitrage opportunities for medicines. Parallel 
import is a solution to the rising price of medicines. However, the risk of patent 
protection and counterfeit, along with unexpected inferior medicines in the 
process of importing, deserve special attention. Gene and Edwin（2006）
believe that if arbitrage of parallel import is tolerated, it may destroy 
intellectual property rights as well as preferential policies for investment in the 
pharmaceutical industry and other research intensive industries. Member 
states can implement International Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights 
to allow parallel import under TRIPS Agreement. When medicine patent law 
is amended or formulated, ensuring public health should be seen as the 
European Scientific Journal April 2018 edition Vol.14, No.10 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
348 
purpose. At the same time, various measures should be taken to prevent 
excessive parallel import of medicines. 
3. Institutional Background and Theory 
Parallel import, also known as the “grey market”, is a phenomenon of the 
combination of intellectual property and international trade. With the 
development of international economics and trade activities, an intellectual 
property can be protected in many nations at the same time, and parallel import 
becomes more common. 
Parallel import in China is generally defined as “unauthorized importers 
import products from other nations without permission of the intellectual 
property owner” (Dong, 2006). In United States, parallel import product is 
often referred as “grey market product” by those who are against parallel 
import. According to the American case law, grey market products are 
“products made out of United States and imported to United States without 
permission of the intellectual property owner. These products nevertheless 
involve effective American intellectual property (Guan, 2010). 
In summary, parallel import is a behavior that unauthorized importers 
import and sell intellectual property goods that are legally manufactured or 
sold in other nations to gain profit because of price differences. As parallel 
import is parallel to regular import, it is called parallel import. It stands as a 
competitor to regular import. The relation between parallel import and “grey 
market” is that parallel import is a kind of behavior, while the market formed 
by this kind of behavior is “grey market” (Guan, 2010). 
There are a variety of forms of parallel import. The first one can be 
identified as “re-import” or “buyback”. The intellectual property right holder 
D is in a high price country A. The cost of its patent product C is 60 and C is 
sold at a price of 100 in country A. Agent E in a low price country B is 
authorized to manufacture product C, whose cost is 60 while the sales price is 
reduced to 80. At the same time, a third party importer F (without permission) 
purchases product C at the price of 80 in the low price country B and sells it 
to the high price country A at a price of 90. In this way, in the high price 
country A, F competes with the intellectual property right holder D with 
obvious price advantages and obtains profit. In United States, the so-called 
“grey market product” mainly refers to product imported in this way. The 
number of this kind of parallel import is large because United States is a high 
price country (Neth, 2008). 
The second form of parallel import is known as “deformation” of the first 
form. The intellectual property right holder D is in a high cost country A. The 
cost of its patent product C is 60, which is sold at the price of 100 in country 
A. Agent E in a low price country B is authorized to manufacture product C. 
The cost of product C is lowered down to 30 in country B, and the sales price 
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is set to 80. At the same time, a third party importer F (without permission) 
purchases product C at the price of 80 from the low price country B and sells 
it to the high price country A at a price of 90. In this way, in country A, F 
competes with the intellectual property right holder D with obvious price 
advantages and obtains profit. Here, the deformation of form two is carried 
out as following. The intellectual property right holder D is in the high cost 
country A. The cost of its patented product C is 60, which is sold at a price of 
100 in country A. In the low cost country B, E is not authorized to produce 
product C. However, E counterfeits product G with the same effect as product 
C in country B. Due to the low cost of country B, the cost of product G is 
decreased to 30 and the price is set at 80. At the same time, the third party 
importer F (without permission) purchases product G at the price of 80 from 
the low price country B and sells it to the high price country A at a price of 
90. In this way, in country A, importer F competes with the intellectual 
property right holder D with obvious price advantages of product G and 
obtains profit. This is actually the case of the practice of the Indian counterfeit 
pharmaceutical industry, which is illustrated in detail in Section 5. 
The third form is a combination of the two forms above. The intellectual 
property right holder D is in a high cost country A. However, due to a series 
of reasons (labor cost, capital cost, production permit etc.), patent product C 
cannot be produced in country A. The intellectual property right holder D 
authorizes agent E in country B to produce product C whose cost is 30 and 
sales price is 80. The intellectual property right holder D imports product C 
from country B and sells it at a price of 100 in country A. At the same time, a 
third party importer F (without permission) purchases product C at the price 
of 80 from the low price country B and sells it to the high price country A at a 
price of 90. In this way, in country A, importer F competes with the intellectual 
property right holder D with obvious price advantages of product C to obtain 
profit. 
In the three forms above, only the third one is the real parallel import. 
The first one is buyback while the second one is only an unauthorized import. 
However, parallel import is not confined to the physical sense of “parallel”. 
To be precise, whether an import is parallel import or not is the legitimation 
of the source of import products. In other words, whether it is placed in an 
exporting country or regional market by the intellectual property right holder 
or to a person that the intellectual property right holder has agreed (Gao, 2007). 
Accordingly, these two situations are regarded as parallel imports as well. 
It is worthwhile considering interest conflicts and coordination of parallel 
import in intellectual property right holder’s angle and consumer’s angle. For 
relevant intellectual property right holders in the importing country, parallel 
import brings about many damages to their own interests. First of all, parallel 
import products take up part of the market share of the intellectual property 
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right holder with price advantage, which makes the market share of the 
intellectual property right holder shrink. Second, “free-riders” of parallel 
importers have led to lack of adequate returns for relevant intellectual property 
right holders. Such companies often invest heavily in developing products, 
launching products to the market, building consumer awareness and 
developing effective marketing networks. On the other hand, parallel import 
is beneficial to intellectual property right holders. First, increase in parallel 
import products can expand the overall sales and market share, which makes 
parallel import products more competitive than similar products. Second, in 
some cases, there would be product surplus in the market of the exporting 
country for some reason. Parallel import can help transfer these products 
quickly to importing market for sales so that the intellectual property right 
holders could benefit (Wang, 2011). 
The most concern for consumers is the price and quality of goods. Despite 
low price, parallel import good is genuine and its quality is basically the same 
as the same product which is manufactured and sold by authorization. 
Consumers can easily buy parallel import goods and enjoy low price because 
of the extended sales channels and the increase in alternative products. This is 
the benefit of parallel import for consumers. The negative impacts of parallel 
import on consumers are that there may be quality differences or quality 
defects. Besides, consumers cannot get after-sales technical services, 
maintenance services, product upgrade services and spare parts supply so that 
the interests of consumers cannot be legally protected. Although parallel 
import has a price advantage, the entire experience may not please consumers. 
It can be seen that parallel import has different advantages and 
disadvantages in different perspectives. Even for the same subject, there are 
positive and negative sides (Wang, 2011). Parallel importers emphasize on 
price competition resulted from parallel import, which helps meet consumer 
demand, and the role parallel import plays in reducing price discrimination. 
 
4. Case Study of the Automobile Industry 
On October 5th, 2005, the European Commission imposed a fine of 49.4 
million euros for the case that the automobile manufacturer Automobiles 
Peugeot SA and its subsidiary Peugeot Nederland NV exported Peugeot 
automobiles to the Dutch market directly without the permission of local 
distributors due to its breach of Article 81 EC in “no abuse of market power” 
and “no cartel”. 
The main basis for this sentence is that Peugeot breaches the selective 
and independent distribution agreement that it signs with its Dutch dealers, 
and causes hostility and restriction on competition. Thus, the deed of Peugeot 
constitutes serious infringement. The infringement act of Peugeot could be 
divided into two parts: one is the discriminatory bonus that Peugeot signs with 
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its Dutch dealers. Employees’ payment is related to car sales. Such bonus has 
fallen sharply after parallel import in the Netherlands. The other is the pressure 
puts on dealers that Peugeot signs with its Dutch dealers. Regional sales cannot 
reach the target after parallel import, which causes loss to local dealers. Such 
losses may also be considered as discriminatory bonus. 
It is obvious to see that this is an interest game between different 
individuals. The impact of parallel import could be analyzed from four angles, 
which are overseas head office, regional authorized dealers, parallel importers, 
and consumers. The first is overseas head office (the original intellectual 
property owner). For head office, in the parallel import process, it is necessary 
to take sales, brand, and possible legal issues into account. Total sales are 
likely to go up but not much. It is not a big deal, but the sales focus has shifted 
from one region to another. However, because of parallel importers’ different 
standards of quality assurance and after-sales services, the formulation and 
maintenance of brand standard can be very difficult. Thus, word of mouth in 
the market would be affected. In addition, because the sales price is difficult 
to control, the competition between the company itself and its rivals in the 
market and the sensitiveness of the company to the market will both decrease. 
The difficulty in making a quick response to the market has left parallel import 
out of the development plan of the head office. The second is regional 
authorized dealers. For dealers, the market is squeezed, the brand reputation 
is negatively affected, and the promised welfare of the head office is reduced. 
These are all the situation of the Dutch dealers in the case of “Peugeot Unfair 
Competition”. At present, the profit of 4S automobile dealers is mainly from 
the manufacturers’ rebates. But larger profit comes from repair and 
maintenance services. The operating profit model of mature 4S automobile 
dealers is that automobile sales account for 30%, after-sales services account 
for 60%, and others only account for 10%. It can be seen that the automobile 
after-sales service market is the most stable profit source in the automobile 
industry, which could account for 60% to 70% of the total profit. The third is 
parallel importers. Free trade and open policy lead to the legitimacy of parallel 
import, which makes parallel importers legitimate businessmen who are 
protected by the policy. Those people can be regarded as speculators who use 
price differences between domestic market and foreign market to carry out 
arbitrage and usually do intellectual property import on the edge of the law 
based on anti-monopoly law. The fourth is consumers. For consumers, parallel 
import brings more alternatives, more automobile dealers, and more car 
models. On the other hand, if the seller’s quality could not be guaranteed, 
consumers need to work hard to improve their judgement capability. 
On January 7th, 2015, the document on parallel import cars in China 
(Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (the document) was released. Shortly after, 
17 automobile companies launched sales of parallel import cars on February 
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10th. With an obvious price advantage, completed configuration, short pickup 
time, and simplified procedure, after the introduction of the new parallel 
import policy, parallel import cars suddenly emerge in China’s market and 
stand against traditional 4S automobile dealers. Parallel import cars bypass 
sales agents and eliminate licensing costs and agency costs. The price of 
parallel import cars is not strictly restricted by manufacturers. Instead, it 
depends on the market. In addition, some of the authorized import automobiles 
have not been publicly released in China or the Chinese version is not 
configured for mass production. For some automobile enthusiasts, buying 
parallel import cars seems to be a better choice. 
As a matter of fact, there have always been parallel import cars in China’s 
import automobile market, but the number of parallel import cars has been at 
a low level due to lack of after-sales services, unavailability of “three 
guarantees”, and restrictions on licensing in China (Ke and Zhang, 2008). 
However, this does not offset the actual price advantage of parallel import 
cars. According to surveys, parallel import cars are about 15% cheaper than 
imported cars in traditional 4S automobile dealers. The launch of the pilot 
project of parallel import cars in China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone has 
gradually removed the “grey” status of parallel import cars, enabling them to 
compete fairly with authorized import car dealers. 
At present, the third party service platform of China (Shanghai) Pilot Free 
Trade Zone carries out after-sales, “three guarantees”, and recall services for 
parallel import cars. The document also clearly stipulates that registered car 
dealers in the Free Trade Zone are the main bodies responsible for the quality 
of parallel import cars, and they should fulfill duties such as product recall, 
quality guarantee, after-sales service, “three guarantees”, average fuel 
consumption approval etc. (Liu, 2014). At the same time, import automobile 
spare parts and maintenance costs are cheaper than that of traditional 4S 
automobile dealers. The new policy, along with the price advantage, 
effectively protects the interests of consumers and promotes parallel import 
cars. 
For the same car model, the price of parallel import cars is reduced by 
10% to 30%. The quotation of parallel import product in customs is just the 
retail price of the product in its original market. However, local authorized 
dealers often take countermeasures which results in the price of cars in 4S 
automobile dealers even lower than that of parallel import cars. 
The model of parallel import cars is estimated to be more plentiful in 
China. Parallel import car dealers can choose different car models for different 
markets, while authorized dealers can only choose the model of cars in their 
own market. However, car models selected by authorized dealers are often 
adjusted and optimized for a particular market. On the contrary, the choice of 
parallel import car models requires consumers’ own judgement. 
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In terms of service, parallel importers often offer much worse services. 
The service cost of authorized dealer is added to the price of the car, while 
parallel import does not. This is just one of the reasons why parallel import 
prices are low. Although parallel importers can form an industrial chain 
alliance, the level of after-sales services is often a weakness. 
 
5. Case Study of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
The concept of “generic medicines” was initiated in United States in 
1984. At that time, there were about 150 common medicines’ patents which 
expired in United States, and large pharmaceutical companies were unwilling 
to continue developing these medicines, which made these medicines 
unclaimed “orphan medicines”. As a result, United States issued a law 
according to which new manufacturers could imitate medicines as long as they 
could prove that the biological effects of their imitated products are 
comparable to the original ones. Thus, the concept of “generic medicine” was 
created. “Generic medicine” and “patent medicines” are totally the same in 
dosage, safety, effectiveness, quality, function and indications. However, the 
average price of “generic medicine” is only 20% to 40% of “patent medicine”. 
Some even have a price difference of more than 10 times. 
In 1952, the Indian government still implemented the product patent law, 
which was from the era of British colonization to strictly controll the 
pharmaceutical industry. European and American pharmaceutical magnates 
obtained patent for developing new prescription medicines by which they 
gained long-term monopoly profits. However, Indian companies were not able 
to develop new patent medicines through research and development. 
Therefore, consumers could only buy expensive prescription medicines from 
European and American companies. Ranbaxy took aim at a sedative called 
“benzodiazepine” of Roche Switzerland, which did not register patent in India, 
and started to imitate it. Later, Ranbaxy imitated the best-selling patent 
product of the world’s largest pharmaceutical company Pfizer. The medicine 
was called Lipitor. Its annual sales reached $13 billion. Ranbaxy not only 
generated huge profits but also provided cheap medicines for the poor. The 
Indian government then decided to encourage local pharmaceutical companies 
after the example of Ranbaxy. The new patent law was promulgated in 1970 
in India which allowed Indian pharmaceutical companies to imitate and 
produce any types of medicines as long as the production process is different 
from the patent production process of other pharmaceutical factories. This law 
cleared obstacles for generic medicines in India. 
In 1995, India joined the WTO and amended the patent law, which grants 
“product patent” to medicines and provides patent protection to medicines 
invented or modified after 1995. Indian generics with huge markets all over 
the world were not willing to exit the market. Therefore, the Indian 
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government came up with a new approach, i.e., patent compulsory licensing 
system for medicines. For example, the Indian Patent Office issued a 
compulsory license for Natco, an Indian pharmaceutical company, to produce 
generic versions of Sorafenib, a liver cancer medicine of Bayer, Germany. The 
patent of Sorafenib is valid until 2021, but Natco began imitating and selling 
it as early as 2000. Bayer took an infringement action to Natco in 2011, but 
unexpectedly met with compulsory licensing. The Indian Patent Office argued 
that medicines of Bayer are too expensive for ordinary people to consume. 
Indian pharmaceutical companies which do not get compulsory license 
sell generic medicines and give patent legal battles with pharmaceutical firms 
at the same time. Today, Ranbaxy sells inexpensive generic medicines to 150 
countries, making itself the world’s fifth-largest pharmaceutical company. But 
Ranbaxy faces various lawsuits every year and it has engaged in lawsuit with 
almost as many as all famous pharmaceutical companies in the world. Novartis 
AG had a law war with the Indian government on patent protection. However, 
Novartis AG lost the lawsuit finally. 
The compulsory licensing system concerning Indian generics can be 
interpreted that country or government directly allows other companies or 
individuals to invent and manufacture generic medicines without the 
permission of patent owner. The aim of compulsory licensing is to promote 
the development of science and technology and to safeguard social justice. 
The rapid development of the Indian pharmaceutical industry is due to loose 
industrial policy, the development strategy which is adapted to its own 
characteristics, and the positive and outgoing idea of development. First, the 
Indian government and the law both support generic medicines. For a 
developing country, economic benefits and medicine availability are the top 
priorities, while intellectual property is only a game rule of the international 
community. This is the reason why the Indian government supports generic 
medicines. Second, Indian pharmaceutical companies have found their own 
positioning. In a country with a medicine penetration rate of only one third, 
effective and inexpensive medicines are the mainstream medicines in the 
market. In fact, India has invested considerable funds in developing 
unpublished prescriptions to meet the needs of the society and promote the 
development of domestic pharmaceutical industry. In the end, India exports 
generic medicines to different countries with a positive and outgoing view of 
development, and other countries allow parallel import medicines based on 
“people –oriented” thought. Lower-priced medicines can meet the 
requirement of increasing social welfare. Developing countries have not 
established a comprehensive health insurance system that can withstand high 
price medicines. Therefore, low-cost medicines have a broad market. 
As for China, on February 16th, 2015, People’s Procuratorate of 
Yuanjiang Municipal made a non-prosecution decision on Yong Lu, who is 
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the first person to buy anticancer medicines as a purchasing agent according 
to law. Regular anticancer medicines for leukemia in China named Gleevec 
are imported from Switzerland, which cost RMB 23,500 yuan per box. The 
similar medicine made in India that Lu purchased from Japan had the same 
effect as Gleevec, but the price is only about 4,000 yuan per box. Later, Lu got 
in contact with the Indian anticancer medicine dealer, India Cyno Company, 
through the contact information provided in the medicine specification, and 
began to buy anticancer medicines directly from it. As the news spread among 
patients, the number of Chinese customers who purchase anticancer medicines 
from Cyno gradually increased. The price of the medicine decreased gradually 
until 200 yuan per box. Lu was called the first person to buy anticancer 
medicines as a purchasing agent and was prosecuted because he shared the 
purchase channel of the Indian anticancer medicine, which is a generic 
medicine of Gleevec, with thousands of others. After 36 days, Lu was 
officially discharged. 
This case provokes people to contemplate a series of questions. Can 
medicines be parallel imported? Should China’s market permit parallel import 
medicines? Can intellectual property issue of parallel import medicines be 
properly solved? Can China sign import contract with pharmaceutical 
companies to put high price anticancer medicines into medical insurance? 
From this, it can be seen that parallel import is not only a breakthrough in the 
current pharmaceutical industry, but also a breakthrough for medical insurance 
reform. The case of anticancer medicines just reflects the demand for parallel 
import medicines in China. 
China has no precedent for parallel import medicines, but it does not 
mean that parallel import medicines are not allowed. Parallel import is less 
harmful to intellectual property laws than generic medicines. China is still a 
developing country of which health care system is not developed yet. Parallel 
import is the best solution to the urgent needs. In terms of parallel import 
medicines, China can learn two points from India. One is to study the rules of 
international intellectual property. Blindly following the rules and regulations 
is not the attitude of a developing country. The attitude of a developing country 
should be to achieve goals and avoid legal risks. Second, China should 
effectively use outsourcing to improve its capacity of independent research 
and development. Now that India’s pharmaceutical industry has reached a 
level of sophistication. Parallel import medicines can be adopted directly. The 
development of China’s pharmaceutical industry is slow, which requires fresh 
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6. Policy Implications 
General Administration of Quality Supervision (AQSIQ) plans to take 
import automobiles from non-authorized channels into Responsibility for the 
Repair, Replacement and Return of Domestic Automobile Products (three 
guarantees). At the same time, the scale of non-authorized import automobile 
dealers in China is small. Hence, taking insurance companies into the three 
guarantees system of non-authorized import automobiles may become a trend. 
The cancellation of the dealer record system and the automobile brand 
management is just a beginning. The establishment of a fair market order is 
the general trend. 
The aim of the initiative of China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone is not 
only to build a platform, but also to establish a set of development system and 
pattern to cover the overall planning of the parallel import automobile industry 
chain from import, logistics, customs clearance, certification, registration to 
dealer management, and after-sales maintenance services. The initiative also 
considers parts and components of parallel import automobiles. China 
(Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone will adopt a parallel import mode for 
components and parts at the same time. 
Meanwhile, parallel importers are also trying to combine e-commerce 
with parallel import automobiles to find new sales models. Some parallel 
import automobile dealers that have entered in the zone are benefiting from 
new policies and therefore trying to sell cars through e-commerce platform at 
the same time. It is not only beneficial to overcome the weakness of lacking 
sales networks for parallel import automobile dealers, but also decreasing the 
concerns of traditional automobile companies. 
At present, China’s trademark law and anti-unfair competition law do not 
make specific provision to parallel import medicine trademark. However, 
China can learn refer to United States. On the premise of necessary 
requirements, parallel import medicines could be permitted. It has a positive 
effect on both the economy and public health. 
For the negative effect of parallel import or export of generic medicines, 
China needs extensive and in-depth exploration. For example, problems that 
affect the quality and safety of medicines and decrease in innovation of 
medicines etc. need immediate attention. China has noticed these negative 
effects. It is formulating related medical intellectual property policies to 
reduce these negative effects. 
7. Conclusion 
In general, the dispute of parallel import is a game of anti-monopoly and 
intellectual property protection. Its core is dispute of interests. When using 
parallel import, the interest balance among nations and public and intellectual 
property protection should be evaluated. Parallel import should be regulated 
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by anti-abusing of intellectual property rights, against unfair competition and 
antimonopoly. In this way, parallel import can be developed in an orderly 
manner and the goal of saving resources and improving economic efficiency 
can be achieved. Also, each country can exploit its comparative advantage so 
resources can be properly allocated. Ultimately, the national social welfare 
would be promoted. 
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